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  This paper examines differences in the size and roles of corporate headquarters around the 
world. Based on a survey of over 600 multibusiness corporations in seven countries (France, 
Germany, Holland, UK, Japan, US, and Chile) the paper describes the differences among countries, 
and then applies a model of the factors determining the size of corporate headquarters (Young, 
Collis, and Goold, 2003) to systematically examine those differences. 
 
The data shows that there are significant differences among countries in the size and role of 
corporate headquarters, and strongly suggests the existence of a developing country model, a 
European model, a US model, and a Japanese model of corporate headquarters. Contrary to popular 
expectations, corporate headquarters in the US are about twice the size of European counterparts. 
Headquarters there exert a higher level of functional influence and have larger staffs in certain key 
areas, such as IT and R&D. US managers are generally more satisfied than their European 
counterparts with their larger more powerful headquarters which suggests that, at least in the US 
context, large corporate headquarters can create value. 
 
Japanese headquarters, as might have been expected, are substantially larger than elsewhere 
– a factor of four times larger than in Europe. However, those headquarters are becoming smaller 
because of dissatisfaction with their performance. It is clear that having headquarters the size of the 
Japanese firms in the survey is not conducive to value creation.  
 
More specifically, the evidence cannot refute a hypothesis that the slope of the relationship 
between firm size and the size of corporate headquarters is the same across all countries, but that 
there are significant differences in the intercept for Chile, the US, Japan, and the European 
countries. What the data indicates is that at a firm employing 20,000, a European corporate 
headquarters would on average employ 124 individuals, a US headquarters would have 255 
employees, and Japan 467 employees.  
 
The paper also examines differences between countries in the extent to which they perform 
the two key corporate tasks of control and coordination. The US and Chile chose to be somewhat 
more interventionist in the traditional tools and processes used to monitor and control business units 
– setting strategy, budgets, and administering capital budgets. However, there was a significant 
difference in the degree of influence in operational affairs between countries. The US and Japan 
exerted far more influence than the other countries over every activity from IT and purchasing, to 
marketing, R&D and HR issues.   
 
The US was also found to have significantly larger legal, tax, and treasury functions than the 
common European model, perhaps reflecting a more legalistic institutional structure. Japan also has 
significantly larger tax, treasury, and corporate management functions, but overall was not that 
much larger than the common European model. 
 
While the causes of these observed differences cannot be directly determined from the 
research, suggestions are made that the institutional infrastructure, the size and homogeneity of the 
domestic market, and cultural factors within countries are important underlying drivers. Analytic Paper 
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INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE SIZE AND ROLES OF CORPORATE 
HEADQUARTERS: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
 
While many aspects of organizational design, such as the M-form organization, are similar 
around the world (Dyas, de la Torre, Stopford), significant international differences have been 
observed in the organisational heritage shared by firms from a single country (Bartlett and Ghoshal 
19  ). Since both micro elements of organization behaviour and macro elements of structure will 
reflect differences in broad societal phenomena, firms headquartered in the same country will adopt 
similar organisational designs (Child and Keiser 1979, European 2002)
 1.  
 
One such difference concerns the size and role of corporate headquarters around the world. 
While drawn from a set of common global templates (Galbraith, Donaldson, Goold and Campbell) 
under the mandate that "structure follows strategy" regardless of domicile (Chandler 1966), the 
design of this entity will be influenced by a myriad of country specific variables from institutional 
systems to those that arise from deeper cultural and historical phenomena values, such as “power 
distance” or “individualism” (Hofstede 1980, 1991). Indeed, specific linkages between elements of a 
nation‟s institutional context and the size of corporate headquarters can be conjectured, such as the 
role that unions play on supervisory boards in Germany, or the impact of bank ownership also in 
Germany (Cable and Dirrheimer 1983). 
 
In particular, the size and role of corporate headquarters should be one of the more sensitive 
indicators of international differences in corporate governance systems. While there is much debate 
over whether economic systems are converging (Kerr er al 1962, Hickson et al 1979) or continuing 
to exist in different forms of capitalism, such as a “Rhine” and “neoAmerican” model within Europe 
(Albert 1993), descriptive research has given rise to a view that there are market-centred and bank-
centred economies (Denis and McConnel 2003). Such differences in governance systems will have 
their most direct influence on CEO level decisions. As the many dramatic alterations in the size of 
corporate headquarters under new CEO‟s at companies like Coca Cola and P&G illustrate 
(Neuborne and Berner 2000, and Faust 2000), the design of corporate headquarters is such a 
decision
2 and so will be directly affected by different governance systems.   
 
Indeed, there is a popular belief that substantial differences in the size and roles of corporate 
headquarters around the world exist and have a substantive influence on firm performance 
(Economist 2000). The US and the UK, after decades pursuing shareholder value under the threat of 
discipline from the capital markets are believed to operate “lean and mean” headquarters that are 
paragons of cost efficiency. In contrast, European and Japanese firms, insulated from the external 
control pressure of “market-centred” economies by their “bank-centred” systems (Denis and 
McConnel 2003), are believed to be bureaucratic and able to afford the “slack” of a large 
headquarters (Skapinker, 2000). The headquarters of Japanese firms, particularly since the bursting 
of the “bubble economy” in the early nineties, are viewed as ripe for restructuring, burdened by a 
legacy of consensus decision making and protected by the keiretsu structure from capital market 
sanction (Helou 1991). Corporate headquarters in developing countries with nascent or missing 
                                                       
1Some go so far as to claim that country of origin has profound and long-lasting effects on firm strategy, (Porter 1996).   
2Indeed, the dissipation of shareholder funds in slack at corporate headquarters is often used to illustrate agency conflict 
between owners and managers (refs).  
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governance systems are believed to be fundamentally different again (Khannah).         
 
 While plausible, there is a dearth of empirical evidence with which to validate or contradict 
these beliefs. In perhaps the only substantive previous empirical research on the size of corporate 
headquarters, the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre conducted a survey of 120 companies in 
the UK (Young and Goold 1993) and the University of Passau surveyed 49 German companies 
(Buhner 1994) in the early nineties. This research effectively described the contemporary state of 
affairs in the UK and Germany, but the question of the generality of the findings to other 
institutional contexts naturally arose. Furthermore, the surveys covered a period before much 
corporate restructuring had occurred. The results, therefore, could be relevant for that time period 
alone, and might not lie on an efficient production frontier.  
 
The absence of research is surprising given that the variation in the size of corporate 
headquarters is astounding. Some companies, like the leveraged buyout firm KKR in the US, can 
operate over $40 billion in revenues with less than eighty people at headquarters (Baker and Smith 
1998). Others, like Coca Cola before its recent restructuring, had nearly five thousand corporate 
employees for less than $20 billion in revenues. Even within a single industry in one country, the 
variance can be enormous. In Germany in the late nineties, the chemical and pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, Hoechst had only 180 people in the headquarters function, at the same time as which 
Bayer had several thousand (Young et al. 2000). 
 
This paper seeks to remedy that deficiency by using a unique database of over 600 
companies in seven countries to determine whether systematic differences in the size and roles of 
corporate headquarters between countries actually exist, and if so, in what ways they differ (Collis et 
al 2005, Goold et al 2002). In particular, we examine whether there is a systematic difference 
between market, and bank centred economies, and between developed and developing countries. 
The most surprising result, to entice the reader, is that American corporate headquarters appear to be 
about twice the size of an apparently consistent European model and yet to be, if anything, more 
effective than those headquarters. Japanese corporate headquarters are substantially larger than US 
companies, and do appear to be less effective. The developing country model of headquarters 
appears to fit none of these developed country models. 
 
The chosen methodology can describe international differences in corporate headquarters but 
does not attempt to account for those differences. While governance systems cannot be the 
explanation, it is recognised that there are myriad other potential causes of those differences, such as 
domestic market size and culture, and we merely conjecture towards the end of the paper as to which 
might account for the observed differences in the size and role of corporate headquarters. 
 
The emphasis in this paper is on describing differences between countries, and it is left to a 
companion paper (Collis et al 2005) to systematically explain the causes of differences in the size of 
corporate headquarters among firms. A book (Young et al 2000) and several papers (Buhner 2000, 
Digmayer 2001, Eppink 1998, Jimenez 2000, Kagono 1998, Young and Goold 1999) present the 
detailed country specific findings of the survey, and provide more normative analyses. 
 
  DISTINCTIVE FUNCTIONS OF CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 
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If we are to document the size and roles of the corporate headquarters, we need a precise 
definition of that entity. Empirically, few companies have difficulty documenting the number of 
employees who are formally employed at corporate headquarters. As a result, the survey data, which 
defined headquarters the same way in each country as “staff functions and executive management 
with responsibility for, or providing services to, the whole of (or most of) the company, excluding 
staff employed in divisional headquarters” should be reliable.  
 
It spite of this, it is theoretically hard to draw precise lines around those activities which are 
performed at headquarters and in the business units (Markides 2002) even though since Chandler 
documented the emergence of the multibusiness corporation (Chandler 1966), it has been recognised 
that corporate headquarters plays a distinctive role in managing diversified firms. Indeed, the 
existence of a discrete headquarters, distinct from and having delegated decision rights to various 
operating units, delineates the M-form multi-business firm from a company that operates in several 
industries with a unitary functional organization structure.  
 
 Defined as the "general office", Chandler originally attributed the unique roles of resource 
allocation, coordination, appraisal, and planning goals and policies to corporate headquarters 
(Chandler 1966 p9). Once self-contained units had been established to operate the corporation‟s 
businesses, a superior entity - the corporate headquarters - still had to fulfill the roles of allocating 
resources among, and providing integration across those businesses, while also monitoring and 
evaluating their performance.     
 
While those roles have not gone away, contemporary research has recognised that corporate 
headquarters also provides the additional functions of public entity reporting, and delivering shared 
services to the businesses (refs Goold et al, consulting firms). It is these four functions that are 
recognised as the distinctive roles of the corporate headquarters in a diversified firm because they 
have to be performed at the supra business unit level. 
 
 
The first, and most important, role derives from the economic justification of the corporation 
as a diversified entity. It involves the functions that a corporate hierarchy performs more efficiently 
than is possible with the market governance of the transaction (Markides 2002).Chandler refers to 
these as the “entrepreneurial“ functions (Chandler 1991), others call them “parenting” skills (Goold 
and Campbell 1996). These are the value creating or coordinative functions which concern the 
development, allocation, and deployment of valuable corporate resources which are subject to scope 
economies (Collis and Montgomery 1997, Teece 1980). 
 
The second role derives from the hierarchical nature of the diversified firm. The existence of 
a discrete corporate office requires it to monitor and control the performance of the autonomous 
units to which operational decision rights have been delegated. Since the corporate entity remains 
ultimately accountable for financial performance, it must adopt a control system to minimize agency 
costs.  
 
In addition, as the legal representative of the firm to external constituencies, corporate 
headquarters bears all the associated reporting obligations and requirements, whether legal, 
financial, or regulatory that accompany such a status.  Analytic Paper 
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The fourth role of the corporate headquarters is providing activities which benefit from the 
operation of scale economies. Typically these activities are back office functions, such as payroll 
processing, that are referred to as “Shared Services” when performed at the corporate level. In 
principle, that shared activity could equally well be located in a business unit. It could even be 
outsourced to a third party, since the economic advantage sought is merely the aggregation of the 
function. There is, therefore, no compelling economic reason for corporate headquarters to provide 
the shared service, even though many companies find locating it there to be convenient.   
       
THEORETICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE SIZE AND ROLES OF CORPORATE 
HEADQUARTERS 
 
  At this point it would be appropriate to lay out a comprehensive theory of the determinants 
of headquarters design. The country specific effects on each of the factors identified in that theory 
could then be identified in order to develop a rigorous theoretical explanation of the nature and 
extent of country differences in headquarters design. Unfortunately, this step is impossible to 
achieve (Collis et al 2005). The varied functions performed at headquarters, and the multiple 
theoretical perspectives, from the resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, Barney, Peteraf) to 
transaction cost economics (Coase, Williamson, ) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, Baker) 
that claim jurisdiction over the phenomena, prohibit the development of a unified theory. Instead, 
we identify in Table 1 the determinants of the size of corporate headquarters which are suggested by 
theoretical frameworks for each of the four roles (Collis et al 2005), and then outline factors that 
will lead to country differences in those determinants. This approach has the merit of practicality 
and is appropriate for the primary aim of a paper which is exploratory and descriptive.     
   
 
  Information processing theory suggests that the more data reporting requirements a firm 
faces, the larger will be the external public company reporting function. Such requirements involve 
legal, taxation, financial, and other filings and will be affected by the external governance 
institutions as  well as by internal organisational design choices. Moreover, it is the existence of 
economies of scale in the performance of common overhead activities, such as payroll processing, 
that allow for the aggregation and centralization of those functions in a “shared services” unit. To 
the extent that firms make a discretionary choice to locate such activities at headquarters, the 
presence of information processing scale economies will therefore increase the size and scope of 
activities performed at corporate headquarters. 
   
  Agency theory is the preferred framework with which to analyse the control function 
performed by corporate headquarters (Eisenhart 19  , Ouchi   , Antle   ). A fundamental distinction 
has been drawn at the corporate level between financial and operating control (Hill et al 1990, Goold 
and Campbell 1987, Collis and Montgomery 1997 and 1998). Financial control corresponds to the 
outcome control resolution of the agency problem by measuring and periodically rewarding business 
units on their financial performance. Operating control, in contrast, is closer to the behavioural 
control solution by directly specifying certain strategies or policies and by continuously monitoring Analytic Paper 
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individual operating decisions
3. The demands on corporate headquarters of each type of control 
system are, therefore, substantially different and will be reflected in much larger headquarters for 
firms practicing operating control.  
 
  Organisational contingency theory  (Donaldson 19  ) has a long history of application to the 
design of corporate headquarters, from its original statement by Chandler that “structure follows 
strategy” (Chandler 1966, p 14). Recently, the preferred contingent variable is the corporate strategy 
– defined as the way the entity seeks to create value from multi-business activity (  ref). This 
suggests a dichotomy between related and unrelated corporate strategies (Rumelt ref), or between 
competitive and cooperative strategies (Hill et al 1990) that has profound consequences for the roles 
and size of headquarters under each of the two strategies.     
 
  Supporting this view with its focus on the value creating function of corporate headquarters, 
is  the resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984, Collis and Montgomery 1997, Markides 
and Willamson 2002). In this perspective, it is the existence of valuable corporate resources that 
justify the existence of multi-business activity by generating scope economies (Teece  1980 and 
1982). Adhering to a contingent view of organizational design that processes to invest in and deploy 
resources across businesses will vary with the nature of the resource, implies that the activities 
performed by corporate headquarters will vary with the valuable resource. While, in principle, the 
list of potentially valuable resources is long, in practice, researchers have argued either that the set is 
dichotomous (Hill et al 1990), or arrayed along a continuum of resource specificity (Collis and 
Montgomery 1997).  
 
  Finally transaction cost theory also illuminates the roles that corporate headquarters must 
perform. The existence of the multi-business corporation requires not only a valuable firm specific 
resource, but also a market failure or inefficiency (Williamson 19   ). In the absence of such a failure 
the value of the resource could be extracted through a market contract. Exactly which markets are 
absent or incomplete, will therefore determine the role that corporate headquarters must perform to 
fill in for those markets.   
 
 
  These theories, with their emphasis on the contingent design of corporate headquarters, 
suggest a number of factors that determine the size of headquarters in any country (see Young et al 
2000, and Collis et al 2005, for more information on the determinants of the size of headquarters). 
While hard to develop accurate measures of those factors, they can pragmatically be categorized as 
due to differences in company size and structure, corporate strategy and the reflection of that 
strategy in the choice of certain policies and systems, and the external context within which that 
strategy operates, including the industries in which the firm competes and the technological and 
institutional structures it faces. These became the object of data collection in the survey (Appendix 1 
describes the variables contained in the survey instrument). 
 
COUNTRY EFFECTS   
   
                                                       
3 A third type, strategic control, is sometimes identified as intermediate between these two extremes (Goold and 
Campbell 1987). Analytic Paper 
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With this framework in hand, it is expected that there will be important country specific 
effects in the design of corporate headquarters which can best be identified for each of the four 
unique functions (Table 1).  
 
  First, the reporting requirements of a public entity - providing the relevant authorities with 
legal, tax, accounting and other types of information that refer to the firm as a whole, will differ 
between countries according to the specific legal mandates and institutional structures that exist in 
those countries. While there is a trend for larger multinationals to list on multiple stock exchanges 
(Siegel  ), and the emergence of international accounting standards, such as    , do suggest a 
convergence of some, primarily financial reporting requirements, substantial idiosyncratic country 
requirements. Similarly, the typical ownership structure, whether state owned, publicly held, or 
privately owned and controlled by an individual or family of firms in a country will affect the 
reporting requirements (Charkham 1994). 
   
Second, the design of a firm's control system will differ among countries. Monitoring and 
reward schemes are designed to optimise individual behavior and so must respect country 
differences that arise from deeply held cultural beliefs that, for example, treat extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards differently, or that value seniority rather than current performance differently, or prefer 
group rather than individual rewards (Laurent 1983 and other refs  ). To the extent to which these 
deeply embedded attitudes about work related values differ among countries (Hofstede 1980, 1991), 
we would expect to see profound differences in control systems between countries. 
 
 
As these monitoring and reward systems can vary from outcome control relying on extrinsic 
individual rewards for meeting a few, primarily financial targets, with limited corporate 
involvement, to behaviour control that monitors and rewards decision-making and so requires 
substantial corporate intervention (Ouchi, Eisenhardt, Hill et al, Collis and Montgomery) the 
potential exists for substantial country differences in the size of corporate headquarters at 
performing this function. Other cultural differences, such as attitudes towards time, can also be 
expected to influence the design of something as fundamental as individual motivations towards 
reward and compensation, as will the administrative heritage of patterns and styles of decision 
making, such as Japan‟s consensus or ringi (Johnson 19*** ) 
 
   
Third, the potential for shared services to be provided at a corporate centre will, to some 
extent, depend on the ability to exploit scale economies that justify aggregating the service at 
headquarters (ref to shared services). Companies based in larger geographic entities lend themselves 
more readily to this sort of activity than those in smaller countries where even aggregating across 
business units might not achieve sufficient scale to justify centralising activities.  
   
Finally, the need for, and extent of the corporate nurturing and allocation of resources 
depends on the demands on the corporation to fill in for missing factor markets (Khannah ). To the 
extent to which market failures and inefficiencies differ among countries (Khannah) we would 
expect the roles that corporate headquarters can economically justify will vary dramatically. In 
developing countries, for example, we might expect training and personnel development to be a 
corporate value adding function given the failures that abound in domestic labor markets (ref). Analytic Paper 
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Ultimately these differences in the value adding functions performed at corporate headquarters can 
be interpreted as differences in a firm's corporate strategy (since they relate directly to the way the 
corporation adds value to its constituent businesses). To the extent that they can be explained by 
differences in corporate strategies, therefore, we would expect a firm specific not a country specific 
explanation for their variation. However, if we cannot fully identify the direct effect of corporate 
strategy on the size and roles of corporate headquarters, any residual variance that has a systematic 
country bias will show up as a country specific effect.  
 
We can , therefore, advance the hypothesis that there will be significant differences in the 
size and roles of corporate headquarters between countries. We have not yet suggested in what 
direction the individual country effects will go. Indeed, the more interesting question is whether 
those differences are in anyway systematically correlated with international differences in 
governance structures. If there is any truth to distinction between market and bank centred 
economies, we could expect the former to have smaller headquarters. JUSTIFY Specifically, we test 
whether there is a significant difference in the size and roles of corporate headquarters between bank 
centred economies (represented in our sample by Japan and Germany), market centred economies 
(UK and USA), and developing countries (Chile).  
 
Methods and Survey Instrument   
 
A survey methodology was adopted because companies are not required to report data on the 
size of headquarters. The most relevant publicly available data is US filings with the SEC which 
include a line item for “corporate expenses”. Unfortunately, this is a residual category after expenses 
have been allocated to self-reported segments, so there is no consistency across companies. In other 
countries, not even this level of detail is publicly available.  
 
Data was collected in a survey of diversified companies undertaken by researchers from 
within each of seven countries between 1997 and 1999
4. Countries were selected to include 
representatives of the four dominant governance systems (Albert 1993) - AngloAmerican, 
Continental European, Asian, and developing countries. Within each sphere, the specific choice of 
country was determined by contacts of the lead researchers. The survey instrument was an amended 
version of that originally employed in the UK in 1993 (Young and Goold 1993) in order to facilitate 
longitudinal comparisons. In five countries the survey was exactly the same, being merely translated 
into the appropriate language. In the US, some definitions were altered to recognise differences in 
contemporary useage – company secretary, for example, has a very different connotation in the US 
than in the UK - and the order and phrasing of some questions was amended. In Japan a local variant 
of the survey was employed which, unfortunately, makes comparison of some measures difficult.  
 
In each country, CEO‟s of the largest corporations, identified as those with more than a 
certain number of employees, were mailed the survey questionnaire (Table 1). After initial 
responses, follow-up mailings and phone calls took place to contact non-respondents. While the 
extent of these contacts varied by country, final response rates were similar across countries, 
                                                       
4 Participants were M.Goold and D. Young of the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre in the UK, D. Collis of the 
Yale School of Management in the US, Georges Blanc of HEC in France, Rolf Buhner of Universtat Passau in Germany, 
Jan Eppink of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Gonzalo Jimenez of Universidad Adolfo Ibanez in 
Chile, and Tadao Kagono of Kobe University in Japan. Analytic Paper 
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averaging about 20%. While larger companies were more likely to respond, there is no reason to 
suspect survey bias. Follow up calls indicated that non-respondents were disproportionately single 
business entities that did not feel the questions were relevant.  
 
The survey asked respondents to list the total number of employees at corporate 
headquarters, as well as the distribution of those employees between each of sixteen functions, such 
as treasury, and across the generic roles
5. The survey, except in Japan, also requested data on the 
total expense of the corporate headquarters. 
 
There was a significant difference in the size of firms responding to the survey in the various 
countries because the economies of the different countries are of markedly different sizes (Table 1). 
Not surprisingly, Chile had the smallest median firm size, measured as number of employees, the 
US the largest. One anomaly appears to be Japan, which has a low median employee size, but the 
highest median revenue per employee. The Japanese industrial structure includes many company 
cross holdings and affiliations, particularly of suppliers, that make establishing the boundary of the 
firm difficult (Kagono 1998). It appears that firm size in Japan as measured by number of employees 
may be understated by excluding subsidiary and affiliated company employees, while effectively 
including their value added in the company‟s revenue. Other statistics describing survey responses 




HEADQUARTERS SIZE: Figure 1 presents the raw data on the size of corporate 
headquarters as a percentage of total corporate employment. Since firm size was the major 
determinant of the share of employees in corporate headquarters in every country, the data is plotted 
against firm size measured as number of employees (Collis et al 2005). The scatter diagram reveals 
enormous dispersion in the size of corporate headquarters. Indeed, there is a factor of almost three 
hundred between the largest and the smallest headquarters at any given firm size. 
 
While there is enormous dispersion in the size of corporate headquarters, even within 
countries (Table 2 shows how the ranges of numbers in headquarters by firm size varied by 
country), important, and surprising country differences are apparent in the regression lines shown in 
Figure 2. While corporations in the different European countries cannot be shown to have different 
relationships between company and headquarters size, the US, and Japan, in particular, have 
significantly larger headquarters
6. Indeed, for the 475 non financial companies that reported separate 
corporate headquarters the data indicates that at a firm employing 20,000, a European corporate 
headquarters would on average employ 124 individuals, a US headquarters would have 255 
employees, and Japan 467 employees
7.  
                                                       
5 For example, respondents were asked for each activity eg payroll administration, what percentage of that group‟s time 
was spent on shared services.  
6 The existence of a common slope among all countries implies that scale economies in the operation of corporate 
headquarters are the same around the world. The slope coefficient in the univariate log/log regression pooled across all 
countries, implies that a doubling of firm size would only increase corporate headquarters staff by ***** - a scale slope 
of nearly 80%. 
7 Given the possibility of mismeasurement of the size of Japanese firms mentioned earlier, some care needs to be taken 
in asserting the degree to which Japanese headquarters are larger than other countries. If we adjust Japanese firm size so Analytic Paper 
 




8 were used to determine whether a single global model could be applied to each 
of the seven countries (Table 3). This showed that, with the exception of Chile, the relationship in 
all countries was significantly different from a pooled global model. Similarly, analysis of variance 
shows that allowing both slope and intercept to vary by country rejects, at the 1% level, the null 
hypothesis of a single global model that fits all countries. However, allowing the slope to vary 
between countries does not significantly reduce variance after incorporating different country 
intercepts
9. Together these results indicate that while there is not a single global model for the 
relationship between firm size and the size of corporate headquarters, we cannot refute a hypothesis 
that the slope of the relationship between firm size and the size of corporate headquarters is the same 
across all countries, but that there are significant differences in the intercept for Chile, the US, 
Japan, and the European countries.  
 
This suggests that there is no difference between bank centred and market centred 
governance systems. Instead it appears that there is a more regional model. When countries were 
tested for their difference from a pooled European model (Table 3), only Germany of the European 
countries showed a significant difference (and only at the 10% significance level), while the US, 
Japan, and Chile did show significant differences. Again, there were no significant differences 
between the slope coefficient of the European model and any individual country.  
 
The stylized fact appears to be that there is a common European model, while the US and 
Japan have larger headquarters, although sharing the same slope with Europe. Chile, as befits a 
developing country, appears to be a model unto itself that cannot be shown to be statistically 
different to any other country
10.     
 
More limited data collected on the expense of corporate headquarters supports this pattern
11. 
Measured as a share of corporate revenue, the US at a median of 1.47%, and Chile at 2.19% had 
substantially more expensive headquarters than the UK 0.65%, Germany 0.60%, and the 
Netherlands 0.71%, even though the median expense for a corporate employee, excluding Chile, 
only varied from a low of $177,000 in the Netherlands to a high of $241,000 in France (Young et al 
2000, Table 3-5).   
 
The evidence of substantial differences in the size of corporate headquarters among 
countries, which supports the existence of a European, a US, and a Japanese model of corporate 
headquarters, was based on a simple univariate regression between firm and headquarters size. 
Given the contingent view of organizational design described above, one reason for the difference 
between the sizes of corporate headquarters among countries could be the many omitted variables. 
To control for this we examined how a more complete model of the determinants of corporate 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that the median revenue per employee is the same as the average of all the other countries, the predicted size of 
corporate headquarters at 20,000 employees would be about 310.        
8 The sample on which these tests were performed excluded financial firms and those without separate corporate 
headquarters – the two types of entity that were outliers in headquarters size. 
9 The null hypothesis of a single slope for all countries was just rejected at the 10% significance level. 
10 The small Chilean sample size and wide variance within the sample makes it hard to demonstrate any statistical 
significance in differences with other countries. 
11 No data on the expense of corporate headquarters was collected in Japan. In France, the median estimate of the fifteen 
reporting firms was 1.31%. Analytic Paper 
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headquarters size differed between countries. This model draws on Collis et al 2005, where a full 
derivation of relationships is presented.  
 
 
The overall size of the firm and its organisation structure can be expected to determine the 
size of corporate headquarters. Information processing theory suggests the operation of scale 
economies in data.  Similarly, the choice of In spite of the widespread dissemination of the M-form 
organisation structure around the world after WW2, it was challenged as the optimal design for 
multibusiness corporations in the seventies by alternative structures, notably the matrix organization 
(Galbraith 1995) and more recently by the network organisation  (Nohria and Eccles 1992) imposes 
differing information processing requirements on the headquarters unit (Galbraith 1995, Egelhoff 
1988), and so can be expected to affect the size of headquarters. Two measures that describe the 
organization structure are the span of control of corporate headquarters, in terms of numbers of 
business units reporting to the center, and the number of organizational layers in the structure.  
 
Dimensions of the corporate portfolio that will affect the size of headquarters include the 
broadly defined industry sector in which a firm competes because this affects the technological 
possibilities for scope economies and hence the degree to which corporate headquarters needs to 
actively coordinate activities across business units (Wiersema and Robbins 1995, Henderson and 
Cockburn 1996) as well as the ability to share services among otherwise separate business units;  the 
relatedness of businesses in the corporate portfolio, which determines the appropriate design of the 
corporation‟s control systems (Hill et al 1992) and coordination systems, such that related portfolios 
will have more horizontal systems and processes than unrelated conglomerates because they can 
valuably leverage resources across multiple business units (Collis and Montgomery 1998); and the 
geographic scope of operations.  
 
Choices a company makes as to the specific policies it employs to manage businesses in the 
portfolio, although jointly determined by the portfolio and structure, will also affect the size of 
corporate headquarters. To capture these phenomenona the survey asked respondents to assess on a 
four point Likert scale the amount of influence and intervention the corporate office had in business 
unit decisions (from general budgeting and strategy issues, to specific functional decisions such as 
pricing and manufacturing); the style of control (whether financial or strategic); and the extent to 
which the corporate office actively exploited linkages across businesses. 
 
In addition, the ownership structure of the firm, which is likely to differ substantially 
between countries, might affect the size of corporate headquarters. Research has demonstrated that 
the governance consequences of privately held and public corporations lead to behavioural 
differences on a number of dimensions, including merger and acquisitions behaviour (Morck et al 
1988), and executive compensation (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989). With respect to corporate 
headquarters, it is possible that publicly quoted companies will see corporate overhead as a 
managerial perk, while privately held firms will maintain efficient headquarters because the agency 
conflict between management and shareholders will be minimized (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
Similarly, nationalized or regulated entities will have objectives that differ from simple shareholder 
value maximization, including the provision of jobs, so that corporate headquarters might be larger 
(Aharoni 1986, Foster 1992).  
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Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regression of these determinants of the size of 
corporate headquarters for all countries, and just for the European countries. Two versions of the 
model are presented, one that excludes corporate policy variables (HQ1 and 2), and one that 
includes those variables (HQ 3 and 4). Nearly all the variables are significant and with the expected 
sign, and the overall predictive power of the regression is high (see Young et al 2003, for more 
details). For purposes of understanding international differences in the size of headquarters, it is 
important to note that the country dummy included in the model is significant at the 0.1% level in 
both regressions including all countries, but it is significant only at the 10 and 5% level for the 
European countries alone, indicating more homogeneity within the European model. 
 
To test for differences in the response of individual variables across countries, we examined 
the significance of the marginal improvement from the interaction of each variable with country 
dummies (Table 5). While there are some significant differences across countries in the effect of 
size, industry sector, influence and linkages, they are muted within Europe where only the slope 
coefficient in this more complex model of the determinants of the size of corporate headquarters 
differs across countries at a significance level of 5% or better.    
 
Importantly, the relative size of corporate headquarters in the different countries indicated by 
this model shows a similar pattern to the previous data (Table 6). European headquarters are about 
one half the size of US headquarters, while Japanese headquarters are at least one third larger even 
when controlling for differences in portfolio, structure, and governance. Again, there is no finding of 
a bank versus a market centred difference in the regressions. 
 
Performance : Given these substantial differences in the size of headquarters between 
Europe, the US, and Japan, we were interested in whether they had any performance implications. 
The evidence suggests that Japanese headquarters are too large, but that US firms are comfortable 
with the relatively large size of their headquarters and see these as creating value. 
  
A direct test of the impact of larger Japanese and US corporate headquarters on financial 
performance runs foul of unobservable country fixed effects. There are many reasons to believe that 
financial measures of performance will systematically vary between countries, from differences in 
equity risk premia (refs) and the risk free interest rate, to accounting and taxation treatments (refs). 
Longitudinal capital market measures of performance across countries will confound changes with 
levels, so that value creation will not identify an absolute effect of corporate headquarters size. 
Cross-sectional capital market performance measures will suffer from country fixed effects on 
valuation. As a consequence we examined more indirect measures of performance.   
 
Over the last five years more US firms have increased the size of their headquarters than 
have decreased them (Table 7). In contrast, all the European countries have seen many more firms 
reduce headquarters than increase them. The US has also seen proportionately more firms increasing 
their influence over business units and providing more services centrally, than their European 
counterparts. This suggests that the role of headquarters in the US has actually been increasing over 
the last several years. In contrast, Japanese firms have been the most likely to reduce the size of 
headquarters in the past.  
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In the next five years the pattern looks similar, with significantly fewer US firms expecting 
to reduce the size of headquarters than in Europe. Japanese firms report a much higher likelihood of 
reducing the size of corporate headquarters over the next five years. This evidence is sympathetic to 
the notion that Japanese firms, under pressure from poor performance and demands for change, are 
beginning to reform themselves and reduce the bureaucracy that has accumulated in the keiretsu.  
 
It is by a very significant margin over all other countries that US firms state their satisfaction 
with the effectiveness of corporate headquarters – overall, and in terms of its cost effectiveness
12 and 
ability to support the corporate strategy (Table 7). This satisfaction rating, is perhaps the strongest 
evidence that for US firms
13, larger headquarters are an advantage, rather than an impediment to 
effective implementation of corporate strategy and does strongly suggest that large headquarters 
staffs can add more than enough value to compensate for their higher cost
14.  
 
In spite of the other evidence, the percentage of Japanese firms that stated they were 
dissatisfied with their corporate headquarters was not substantially different to European firms. 




 Part of the explanation for the substantial differences between countries in the size of their 
headquarters comes from a more detailed examination of the specific functions that are performed at 
headquarters (Table 8, and in the relative size of some of those functions in different countries 
(Table 9)  
 
For the set of what might be considered public company or core corporate functions, very 
nearly every country has more than 90% of companies reporting the performance of those functions 
at headquarters – the top half of Table 8– (although quite how any corporation can survive with no 
corporate executives is a mystery!). Chi square tests were performed for the significance of the 
difference in the incidence of the functions between a pooled European model and the US and 
Japan, and within Europe and are reported in Table 9
15. These, show few significant differences in 
incidence because in all countries certain core functions are the essential minimum roles of any 
corporate entity.   
 
With the notable exception of Chile
16, which has substantially larger numbers, the median 
sizes of these public company functions are also similar around the world (Table 9, which shows the 
median number of headquarters staff per thousand employees in a function in each country). The US 
                                                       
12 Although satisfaction levels are self-reported, there is confirming evidence that they reflect effectiveness. Those 
companies who reported that cost effectiveness needed to be improved in many areas of headquarters, had 2.5 times the 
number of staff, when adjusted for firm size, than companies that reported the cost effectiveness of their headquarters 
was good in most areas.   
13 Unless the satisfaction level merely reflects a natural American “irrational exuberance” 
14 Tests of the relationship between size of corporate headquarters and measures of performance, including return on 
capital and total returns to shareholders, did show a positive relationship, although this begs the question of causation 
(see Young et al 2003 for more details).   
15 The sample size for Chile was too small to report tests of significance at this level of refinement. 
16 Because there are scale economies in the size of functions, Chile, which has smaller firms, will appear to have 
relatively more staff in each function. Analytic Paper 
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was found to have significantly larger legal, tax, and treasury functions than the common European 
model, perhaps reflecting a more legalistic institutional structure. Japan also has significantly larger 
tax, treasury, and corporate management functions. However, in aggregate the size of these 
functions in the US and Japans was not that much larger than the common European model.  
 
One of the interesting implications of this analysis concerns the minimum size of a corporate 
headquarters. It appears that in many countries it would be possible to run a 20,000 employee firm 
with only 27 people in headquarters. Those who doubt the feasibility of such a small headquarters, 
should note that ***** % of firms above that size did in fact report headquarters that small.  
 
For a broad range of tasks whose salience would be expected to vary with corporate strategy, 
there is, however, considerable variation among countries – the lower half of Tables 8 and 9 where 
Chi squared tests of the difference between the US and Japan and a common European model are 
reported. Both the incidence and the size of many of those functions are very different between 
countries. European companies tend to have fewer of these functions and to have smaller such 
functions. Japanese headquarters both perform more of these tasks and have more staff in each 
function. The US is somewhat between the two extremes, and Chile is, again, a world unto itself. 
This data confirms the distinction between a European, Japanese, American, and developing country 
model of the roles of corporate headquarters. 
 
Probably the most important differences in the incidence and size of discretionary functions 
in the US concern the IT, pension and pay administration, training, purchasing, marketing, and 
distribution functions. It is these functions that US corporations are significantly more likely than 
their European counterparts to perform at headquarters. The US also has a significantly larger IT 
function at headquarters than do European countries, in this case by a factor of nearly ten. This 
combination of a higher incidence of this function and its larger size means that IT makes a 
substantial contribution to the larger overall size of US corporate headquarters. In addition, although 
the incidence of the R&D function is similar in the US and Europe, when it does occur it is 
substantially larger in the US. There is a clear willingness in the US to have large corporate staffs in 
certain key activities. 
 
The incidence of “discretionary” functions at corporate headquarters (Table 8) reveals just 
how extreme is the Japanese version of corporate headquarters. For every discretionary function, 
except corporate planning (which appears to show the reticence of Japanese firms to consider 
corporate planning a discrete function), Japan has higher incidences of the function being performed 
at headquarters than any other country.  Many functions, such as HR management and training, 
which appear to be discretionary in other countries, are almost universal within Japanese companies. 
It is clear that the Japanese corporate headquarters is far more involved in the operation of its 
businesses than in any other country. 
 
 The size of discretionary functions in Japan is also significantly larger than in Europe (Table 
9). Every discretionary function is larger than Europe, and the differences are particularly large in 
R&D and IT. It is also interesting to note that Japanese firms have much larger corporate 
departments for what are traditionally thought of as operating activities, such as marketing and 
purchasing. Japanese corporations are not just involved in the operation of their businesses, they 
also have a corporate staff of a size capable of substantial intervention.  Analytic Paper 
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Peeling the onion of country differences one level further to explain why the US and Japan 
have more discretionary and larger functions at headquarters, we can examine differences between 
countries in the role played by corporate headquarters in the operation of the business units, and the 
extent to which they perform the two key tasks of control and coordination (Table 10).  
 
To examine how companies controlled their business units, the survey asked about the 
assessment method that was used to evaluate overall performance. While in every country about 
10% of firms primarily used financial targets for performance assessment, countries differed in their 
preferences for using strategic targets, such as long-term competitive position, or a mix of financial 
and strategic targets. The US and the UK are similar in favouring strategic target setting, along with 
France and Germany, whereas Chile, Japan and, perhaps, surprisingly, the Netherlands, preferred a 
more mixed assessment (Table 10). 
 
With respect to control, one revealing difference between countries was apparent in the 
degree to which corporate headquarters chose to directly influence specific business unit decisions
17 
(Table 10). The US and Chile chose to be somewhat more interventionist in the traditional tools and 
processes used to monitor and control business units – setting strategy, budgets, and administering 
capital budgets - in which every country had a relatively high degree of intervention (an average 
score of 2.3 for each on a 3 point Likert scale). But there was a significant difference in the degree 
of influence in operational affairs between countries. The US and Japan exerted far more influence 
than the other countries over every activity from IT and purchasing, to marketing, R&D and HR – 
an average of 1.6 versus 1.2 per activity.  
 
The data, therefore, shows that corporate headquarters in the US and Japan have 
systematically more influence on the operational activities of their businesses than in Europe and 
Chile. While we might not be surprised that this is the case in Japan, to find a more interventionist 
and controlling headquarters in the US was unexpected, and partially accounts for the finding of 
larger headquarters in the US
18.    
 
  Table 10 also reports the differences among countries in the extent to which corporate 
headquarters coordinated the operations of the various businesses by exploiting specific linkages. 
The US had a linkage score exactly the same as the European scores. This suggests that larger US 
headquarters are not due to more involvement in coordinating activities across businesses, but rather 
are due to more intervention within each separate unit. In fact, Chilean firms were the only outlier in 
the degree to which they tried to exploit linkages.  
 
                                                       
17 Respondents could rank each variable on a four point Likert scale, with the least amount of influence set to zero. The 
maximum possible score for influence of traditional control variables was 9.0 (three measures times a score of 3), and 
for 15.0 for operational variables (five measures times a score of 3).  
18 American companies also report a much lower share of the corporate headquarters functions is spent in the provision 
of services to the business units. On average US firms report that about 20% of the time of the core functions involves 
the provision of shared services, while about 40% of the remaining functions are shared services. In contrast, for 
European firms about 45% of the core functions time is spent in services for the businesses, and about 60% of the other 
functions. This confirms the notion that American corporate headquarters play a much more independent role than their 
European counterparts Analytic Paper 
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Japan also had a linkage score similar to the European model. Given that Japanese corporate 
portfolios were more related in a ranking of the similarity of their business portfolios in terms of 
products and services, product and process technologies, and customer dimensions which indicates 
that there was more potential for synergies among businesses in the portfolio (Table 10), this was an 
unexpected finding. Unfortunately, it almost certainly reflects a variation in the survey used in 
Japan, and not indifference to the potential for exploiting synergies among related businesses. 
Rather than phrasing the question positively, on the Japanese survey, the linkage question was 





  The data shows that there are important differences among countries in the size and role of 
corporate headquarters, and strongly suggests the existence of a developing country model, a 
European model, a US model, and a Japanese model of corporate headquarters. Surprisingly, given 
that the legal and institutional structures that might be expected to shape corporate headquarters 
differ between AngloAmerican and Continental European traditions, there appears to be a consistent 
European and a discrete American model of corporate headquarters. In fact, US headquarters are 
about twice the size of their European counterparts, and certainly twice the size of their UK 
equivalents. In Japan, corporate headquarters are substantially larger again. Chilean headquarters are 
all over the place because the concept of corporate headquarters is emergent in developing countries 
where family owned groups remain dominant and market failures of all types are widespread 
(Jimenez 2000, Khanna *****  ). 
 
Explanations for the differences between the US, Japanese and European models are 
necessarily conjectural. What is clear is that Japan has substantially more functions at the corporate 
level and larger staffs in those functions, and that US headquarters are more interventionist than 
their European counterparts and are more likely to have large central staffs in certain key functions, 
notably IT and R&D.  
 
 The Japanese model of large interventionist corporate headquarters might well be due to 
prohibition of the zaibatsu organizational form under the Occupation legislation, which essentially 
prohibited the M-form structure. In its place, firms that sought to manage portfolios of different 
businesses were compelled to perform a substantial amount of activities at the headquarters of a 
company that did not formally control those entities. As a result, corporate headquarters of keiretsu 
companies might be managing larger business portfolios than they formally report controlling. 
Indeed, if we adjust the number of employees at each Japanese firm so that their mean revenue per 
employee is the same as European firms, the average size of corporate headquarters would fall from 
467 for a company of 20,000 employees to 310***, at which point it is still more than twice as large 
as European firms but closer to US firms. 
 
Some of the difference in size of Japanese headquarters might also reflect a belief that 
resources are owned by the corporation and made available as needed to the businesses. This would 
explain the large staffs in corporate R&D and HR, as well as the substantially higher overall level of 
                                                       
19 Such problems, unfortunately, are often unavoidable in comparative international research that is performed 
collaboratively. Analytic Paper 
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influence that Japanese headquarters exert over their businesses. It is also likely that the higher 
degree of relatedness in the corporate portfolio of businesses reported in Japan reflects more intense 
coordination across businesses even though the choice of survey question did not actually elicit a 
positive response in Japan.   
 
The dissatisfaction expressed with the effectiveness of Japanese corporate headquarters and 
the intention of the vast majority to reduce the size of those offices in the next five years, however, 
does suggest that there is real inefficiency in the current structure. Part of this may be due to 
structural inefficiencies in Japan, such as the difficulty using Kanji character computers in white-
collar jobs, but much of it must be simply due to a historical cultural acceptance of inefficiency and 
excessive bureaucracy in the corporate office. In turn, some of this might be due to the ringi or  
consensus decision making process which requires more managerial time (Chalmers ****). 
Certainly, it is hard not to attribute some of the size of Japanese headquarters to the culture of 
lifelong employment and the absence of severe discipline from the capital markets in the Japanese 
governance system. Contested takeovers are rare in Japan, which would allow slack to become 
entrenched in large headquarters. 
 
The existence of a European and an American model, rather than a Continental and an Anglo 
Saxon model was a surprise. The US was found to have significantly larger corporate headquarters, 
which perform more functions, and were significantly more influential over the operation of the 
businesses. This finding was a surprise, given the ideology of independence, decentralization and 
market forces in the US. Its value was however confirmed by the satisfaction US managers 
expressed, relative to their European counterparts, with the performance of those larger 
headquarters. Perhaps, the large homogeneous domestic market has allowed corporate executives to 
be more involved in the businesses and has facilitated centralisation. IT facilities, for example, 
might be easier to provide centrally in the US, or at least be more closely directed by corporate 
headquarters because there is only one geography to deal with. In Europe, differing standards for 
different countries might compound the problem of differing business requirements, and so lead to a 
more decentralized solution. Certainly, there seems to be more willingness in the US to have large 
central units, like R&D, that perform key activities for the company as a whole.   
 
That the four European countries were surveyed were so alike in the size and roles of 
corporate headquarters was also a surprise. Given the very different industrial structures, to say 
nothing of the different legal and institutional traditions and governance structures, the finding of 
similarity was a definite surprise. Only Germany, which was significantly different at the 10% 
****level in an F test of European homogeneity, appeared to be any different to a common model. 
Perhaps, the EU has had more impact on corporate actions than previously thought in leading to 
convergence, or perhaps the recent emphasis on shareholder value has led to similar actions with 
regard to corporate headquarters. It has certainly led to substantial recent downsizings at companies 
as varied as Hoechst, Philips, and BNP.  
 
That European firms systematically have the smallest corporate headquarters was 
nevertheless a surprise. One explanation for Germany‟s small corporate headquarters is the use of 
the “management holding” company structure. Employed to exploit tax advantages, the consequence 
has been the decentralization of responsibility to separate legal entities (Buhner 2000), and the 
consequent reduction in the corporate staff. Offsetting this, is the ongoing role of codetermination in Analytic Paper 
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German governance structures, which might be expected to increase the size of corporate 
headquarters.  
 
Dutch firms had the greatest international scope of all the countries in the survey, and the 
fact that they had relatively small corporate headquarters certainly supports an argument that 
operating in many different countries may actually decrease the size of headquarters since it can 
only manage dispersed operations effectively by allowing more independence to overseas 
subsidiaries. Indeed, geographic scope was not found to be a significant predictor of corporate 
headquarters size (Table 5). 
 
It is possible to look at changes in the size of UK headquarters because of the prior Ashridge 
study in 1993 (Young and Goold 1993). This shows that in spite of the increasing rhetoric about 
shareholder value and decentralization in the UK, corporate headquarters have not declined 
substantially in the last five years. It was only the largest companies that have seen any decline in 
the average size of headquarters between the two survey dates (Young et al 2000, Figure 6-2).      
 
Nevertheless, we should not overreach in our claims to understand the causes of the 
international differences we observed in the size and roles of corporate headquarters. This paper set 




Its main finding that there is not a “market centered” and “bank centered” model of corporate 
headquarters, suggests that at the level of important corporate decisions, other phenomenon have 
important independent influences. 
  
 Nevertheless, it is clear that we should not over-estimate the importance of differences in 
broad corporate governance systems on micro-level economic phenomena. Nor should we believe 
that a convergence in the formal aspects of these structures will necessarily lead to the convergence 
of firm behaviour. Other, equally deep rooted phenomena are at work in determining such important 
elements of corporate structure as the size of corporate headquarters.  
 
 
 There are wide variations in the size and role of corporate headquarters both between 
countries and within countries. Indeed, amongst all the evidence of global differences, we should not 
overlook the fact that there is more variation within each country than there is between countries. 
Some of those intra-country differences in size are simply the result of scale economies in the 
operation of corporate headquarters. Larger firms have proportionately smaller headquarters than 
small firms, regardless of country of origin. Some of the intra-country differences are the result of 
the various corporate strategies that firms within a country pursue. Since many of the functions 
performed at corporate headquarters are contingent on the strategy (Young et al 2003), variation in 
the size of corporate headquarters within a country is only to be expected. In particular, the extent to 
which the corporate strategy seeks to create value by directly influencing business unit operations, 
and actively managing linkages between those units has a major influence on the size of corporate 
headquarters, even within a country. 
 Analytic Paper 
 
Ashridge Strategic Management Centre 
20 
  More normatively, the evidence does suggest, in line with a contingent view of corporate 
headquarters design, that it is not universally valuable to have small corporate headquarters. While 
companies with small headquarters can be successful, even in the US, it is clear that larger 
headquarters can also be correlated with high performance and executive satisfaction with their role 
and cost effectiveness.  
 
  It is evident, however, that differences in institutions and culture lead to differences in 
corporate headquarters among countries. The context in Japan and Chile is very different from that 
in the US and Europe and results in headquarters with very different sizes and roles. Globalisation, 
free flows of capital and ideas about corporate strategy might have led European countries to 
converge on a common model for headquarters, while Japan is clearly moving towards US and 
European practices, but differences remain. 
 
 Evidence strongly supports a finding that, contrary to popular expectations, corporate 
headquarters in the US are about twice the size of European counterparts. Headquarters there exert a 
higher level of functional influence and have larger staffs in certain key areas, such as IT and R&D. 
US managers are generally more satisfied than their European counterparts with their larger more 
powerful headquarters which suggests that, at least in the US context, large corporate headquarters 
can create value. 
 
Japanese headquarters, as might have been expected, are substantially larger than elsewhere 
– a factor of nearly four times Europe. However, those headquarters are becoming smaller because 
of dissatisfaction with their performance. It is clear that having headquarters the size of the Japanese 
firms in the survey is not conducive to value creation.  
 
The single developing country in the sample, Chile, does not appear to display a consistent 
approach to the size or role of corporate headquarters probably because the concept itself is only 
recently emerging (Jimenez 2000). Indications are that it will gradually converge on a more 
traditional model over time. Reliance on a single data point, however, does suggest the need to 
replicate this research in other developing countries before confirming the conclusion.   
   
There is substantially less divergence across countries when comparing the size of only the 
minimum corporate parent functions. This suggests that there is a more global approach to the 
provision of these obligations. Substantive differences between countries arise from differences in 
the extent to which the corporate center intervenes in business unit activities or provides central 
resources and services to those businesses. Given the continuing divergence of the US and European 
models, it would be premature to predict convergence on a single global model of corporate 
headquarters, at least in these activities.     Analytic Paper 
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Figure 1. Headquarters staff versus company size  
Figure 2 Regression of headquarters staff versus company size by country
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Table 1. The surveys 
France Germany Netherlands UK USA Japan Chile
Period of survey 1998-99 1997-98 1997-98 1997-98 1998-99 1997-98 1998
Target size (employees) >2,000 >2,000 >2,000 >2,000 >5,000 >2,000 >1,000
Companies approached 170 370 120 500 840 870 200
Number of responses
a
41 57 40 101 96 220 50
Percentage response 24% 15% 33% 20% 11% 25% 25%
Median employees (000) 24.7 10.0 7.3 10.8 24.7 6.1 2.1
Median turnover ($bn)
b
6.12 1.98 2.01 2.17 3.54 2.75 0.18
a. These numbers exclude some companies that were judged to be subsidiaries of other companies.
b. Industrial companies only. Turnover not measured for financial services companies.  
 
 Table 2.  Headquarters staffing 
  FRA  GER  NL  UK  USA  JPN  CHL  All 
Number of companies  39  55  39  100  91  163  49  536 
Number of headquarters staff 
Minimum  12  15  8  10  7  32  2  2 
Maximum  3,800  17,100  1,115  8,100  13,030  7,912  1,328  17,100 
Percentiles  10  15  26  19  16  52  88  12  25 
50  290  240  61  103  400  226  46  184 
90  2,800  1,790  300  1,190  2,000  779  195  1,161 
Number of HQ staff per 1000 employees 
Minimum  0.2  1.0  1.4  0.7  0.7  3.0  0.8  0.2 
Maximum  349.1  670.1  107.1  890.6  295.9  336.2  324.6  890.6 
Percentiles  10  1.4  2.0  3.1  2.9  3.1  14.8  4.3  3.2 
50  10.0  9.3  7.4  7.3  14.8  38.7  25.8  19.7 
90  59.5  188.9  26.7  60.1  96.2  109.2  116.7  105.9 
Geometric mean  10.0  17.6  8.5  9.8  15.9  38.9  25.4  18.6 
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          Table 3      
                        Chow Tests of Sample Homogeneity    
             
           Global Model          European Model   
             
         F TEST       F TEST   SLOPE 
CHILE    0.98             4.81*         3.82* 
FRANCE          4.28**          0.42   
GERMANY        3.50*              3.02* 
NETHERLANDS        7.06**          0.35   
UK        17.84**          1.54   
USA          3.37*            11.61**     0.001 
JAPAN        47.27**           74.1**        [.103] 
             
  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE  
              
   SLOPE  1.85   SLOPE         [0.53] 
  SLOPE AND      13.64**  SLOPE AND 
 
1.04   
  INTERCEPT    INTERCEPT   
             
  * 5%, ** 1% significance       
  [interpolated}         Analytic Paper 
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Table 4. Regressions for proportion of employees in corporate headquarters 
 
Log(HQ staff per 1000 employees) - Analysis of variance (Type III sums of squares)
HQ1 HQ2 HQ3 HQ4
All Europe All Europe
Corporate portfolio
Number of employees 15.080 - *** 6.312 - *** 13.561 - *** 6.375 - ***
Industry sector 17.585 *** 15.077 *** 15.244 *** 12.231 ***
Relatedness 1.464 + ** 2.132 + *** 0.009 - 0.052 +
Geographic scope 0.026 + 0.204 +
Corporate structure
Span of control 0.014 + 0.046 - 0.038 + 0.246 -
Organizational layers 2.528 - *** 2.326 - *** 1.183 - ** 1.043 - **
Corporate policies
General influence 0.457 - 0.364 -
Functional influence 5.381 + *** 3.937 + ***
Financial control 0.092 - 0.074 -
Linkages 0.857 + * 0.351 +
Shared services 1.780 + ***
Services data missing 1.049 + **
Ownership & regulation
Privately owned 0.172 + 0.887 + * 0.005 + 0.254 +
Government owned 4.291 + *** 4.999 + *** 2.573 + *** 2.789 + ***
Regulated public 0.483 + 0.265 + 0.331 + 0.315 +
Privatized 1.653 + ** 2.305 + *** 1.305 + ** 1.448 + **
Country 21.274 *** 1.465 # 14.223 *** 1.453 *
Corrected model 83.176 *** 46.945 *** 91.155 *** 55.060 ***
Residual 84.172 37.312 76.193 29.197
Corrected total 167.349 84.257 167.349 84.257
RMS residual 0.437 0.434 0.417 0.390
R squared 0.497 0.557 0.545 0.653
Adjusted R squared 0.469 0.506 0.514 0.601
N 467 222 467 222
+ and - indicate the sign of the regression coefficient for quantitative variables.
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  Table 5. Tests for differences in response across countries 
Log(HQ staff per 1000 employees) - Analysis of variance (Type III sums of squares)
HQ1 HQ2 HQ3 HQ4
All Europe All Europe
Marginal improvements from inclusion of interactions with Country
Corporate portfolio
Number of employees 2.916 * 1.307 # 3.025 ** 1.209 *
Industry sector 14.426 # 4.097 13.559 * 3.407
Relatedness 2.272 # 0.478 1.669 0.464
Geographic scope 0.540 0.344
Corporate structure
Span of control 0.473 0.175 0.452 0.074
Organizational layers 2.342 # 0.031 1.627 0.073
Corporate policies
General Influence 0.435 0.080
Functional Influence 2.617 ** 0.221
Financial control 1.698 1.034 #
Linkages 2.282 * 1.008 #
Shared services 0.288
Ownership & regulation
Privately owned 1.071 0.164 0.840 0.057
Government owned 1.169 0.273 0.825 0.199
Regulated public 0.512 0.167 0.569 0.370
Privatized 1.454 0.731 1.073 0.590
Significance levels: # p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  






France  39           x0.66  x0.41 
Germany  47           x0.69  x0.68 
Netherlands  38           x0.33  x0.32 
UK  98           x0.46  x0.40 
USA  87           x1.00  x1.00 
Japan  116           x1.42  x1.37 
Chile  42           x0.57  x0.43 
N  467  467 
Significance  p<0.001  p<0.001 
a. Controlled for company size. 
b. Controlled for corporate portfolio, corporate structure, ownership and regulation. 
Relative number of headquarters staff 
Country 
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Table 7 Changes to, and effectiveness of corporate headquarters 
 
                                 NET CHANGE IN HEADQUARTERS        
                        (%reporting increase - % reporting decrease)     
                 
PAST FIVE YEARS CHILE  FRANCE  GERM.  NETH.  UK  US  JAPAN 
No. of staff  34  -23  -14  27  -19  19  -39 
Outsourcing  36  30  47  20  32  37  -3 
HQ influence  24  30  2  12  15  27            na 
Services provided  19  23  25  -7  13  36  7 
                 
FUTURE FIVE YEARS             
No. of staff  10  -25  -33  -23  -22         -13*  -70 
Outsourcing  38  31  35  9  36          40*  10 
HQ influence  23  20  2  16  19  20            na 
Services provided  21  20  14  -11  3          30*  8 
                 
        EFFECTIVENESS       
GOOD IN MOST AREAS 
 (% reporting)             
Overall    23  22  38  32  24           61**  27 
Cost Efficiency  41  27  38  45  31          53*             na 
Support Strategy  45  29  50  30  34          63**            na 
  
 Table 8. Functions included in corporate headquarters 
 
FRA  GER  NL  UK  USA  JPN  CHL    Europe 
General corporate management  100%  90%  95%  93%  95%  99%* 100%      94% 
Legal & company secretary  89%  88%  100%  100%  100%  95%  82%      96% *** 
Treasury  87%  87%  95%  97%  100%* 100%*
* 
98%      92% # 
Taxation  89%  90%  92%  99%  95%  94%  73%      94% # 
Financial reporting & control  97%  94%  100%  100%  91%  100%*
* 
94%      98% # 
Internal audit  89%  83%  64%  84%  93%*
* 
95%  67%      81% * 
Pensions/ payroll/ benefits administration  68%  60%  67%  92%  91%*
* 
97%  49%      76% *** 
Human resources/ career development  87%  79%  95%  81%  86%  100%*
* 
63%      84% 




41%      58% # 
Government & public relations  87%  92%  87%  85%  87%  96%*
* 
61%      87% 




71%      86% * 
Research & development  39%  33%  41%  27%  40%  68%*
* 
49%      33% 




53%      35% 




47%      38% * 
Distribution/ outbound logistics  18%  12%  5%  7%  41%*
* 
47%  39%      10% 




57%      69% 
Significance levels: # p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Function 
% of companies including function within headquarters 
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 Table 9. Function staffing levels 
 
FRA  GER  NL  UK  USA  JPN  CHL   
General corporate management  0.43  0.93  0.51  0.56  0.48  1.14*  2.92   
Legal & company secretary  0.80  0.63  0.67  0.52  0.94*
* 
0.63  1.33   




2.00   




0.67   
Financial reporting & control  0.93  0.80  1.08  0.81  0.42  1.51  2.36   
'Obligatory' functions  2.08  3.62  3.20  2.59  3.40  5.33  10.00   
Internal audit  0.49  0.34  0.37  0.40  0.48  0.66  1.50   
Pensions/ payroll/ benefits administration  0.44  0.56  0.76  0.61  0.91  1.06  2.50   
Human resources/ career development  0.74  0.61  0.57  0.45  0.61  2.01  1.71   
Training & education  0.24  0.26  0.37  0.19  0.30  0.98*
* 
0.95   
Government & public relations  0.35  0.44  0.43  0.25  0.40  0.72*  0.82   
Corporate planning/ development  0.35  0.38  0.42  0.32  0.40  0.51  1.91   
Research & development  0.59  3.64  0.27  1.99  3.33  6.31*
* 
2.86   
Marketing/ commercial services  0.65  0.92  1.79  0.49  0.68  2.60*  3.88   
Purchasing/ inbound logistics  1.33  1.65  0.53  0.45  0.70  2.17*  3.00   
Distribution/ outbound logistics  1.25  7.65  1.55  0.25  0.75  1.59  4.00   




4.36   
Other  3.01  1.40  0.80  0.81  3.00  7.65  5.07   
'Discretionary' functions  7.55  2.75  5.43  3.71  10.00  32.04  17.50   
Function 
Median headquarters staff per 1000 employees 
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  Table 10. Corporate policies 
  FRA  GER  NL  UK  USA  JPN  CHL  All 
Number of companies  39  55  39  100  91  163  49  536 
General planning influence (mean scales 0-3) 
Setting of budgets and financial targets  2.08  1.95  2.28  2.24  2.52  2.26  2.22  2.25 
Major capital investments  2.33  2.13  2.41  2.35  2.61  2.14  2.76  2.35 
Business strategy/ new business creation  2.64  2.35  2.24  2.29  2.22  2.07  2.20  2.23 
General planning influence score (0-9)  7.05  6.42  6.91  6.88  7.36  6.46  7.18  6.83 
SD of general influence score  1.56  1.81  1.80  1.83  1.86  2.14  1.80  1.93 
                 
Functional planning influence (mean)  
Human resources   1.74  1.33  1.46  1.45  1.69  2.01  1.61  1.68 
Research and development   1.31  1.37  1.21  0.92  1.63  1.65  1.37  1.39 
Marketing   1.21  1.04  0.87  0.92  1.25  1.40  1.43  1.19 
Purchasing/ logistics   1.00  1.30  0.79  0.91  1.54  1.17  1.27  1.17 
Information technology   1.87  1.75  1.64  1.60  2.20  2.09  1.27  1.85 
Functional planning influence score (0-15)  7.13  6.79  5.98  5.79  8.35  8.31  6.97  7.29 
SD of functional influence score  3.63  3.93  3.67  3.92  4.09  3.34  4.37  3.92 
                 
Assessment method  
Flexible strategic    33%  25%  56%  30%  29%  52%  58%  40% 
Tight strategic    49%  62%  38%  59%  60%  39%  31%  49% 
Tight financial    18%  13%  5%  11%  11%  9%  10%  11% 
100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
                 
Linkages among divisions (mean) 
Provision of products and services   1.33  1.26  1.31  1.35  1.26  0.80  1.98  1.21 
Dev. of product/ process technologies   1.33  1.27  1.28  1.23  1.40  1.00  1.79  1.26 
Dealings with customers   1.15  1.00  0.87  1.06  1.07  1.25  1.57  1.15 
Linkage score (0-9)  3.82  3.53  3.46  3.64  3.72  3.05  5.34  3.62 
SD of linkage score  2.58  2.63  2.39  2.69  2.64  2.45  2.51  2.62 
                 
Relatedness score 
Mean     4.23  4.28  3.97  4.23  4.43  5.14  4.42  4.55
5  SD    2.48  2.64  2.63  2.56  2.40  2.21  2.52  2.45 
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Headquarters staffing and structure 
Proportion of employees 
working in headquarters 
Log(number of headquarters staff per 1000 employees) 
Obligatory staff  Total staff in five functions included in most headquarters. 
Discretionary staff  Total headquarters staff - obligatory staff. 
Change in headquarters 
staff 
Scale (-1 to +1) indicating level of staff compared to five years ago: -1 = lower; 0 = 
same (± 10%); +1 = higher. 
Corporate portfolio 
Number of employees  Log(total company employees). 
Industry sector  Categorical (12 values). 
Geographical spread  Scale (1-4): 1 = operates in one country; 2 = one continent; 3 = two continents; 4 = 
three or more continents. 
Relatedness of divisions  Score (0-9) based on extent of similarity of divisions in three areas: products/services, 
product/process technologies, and customer bases. 
Corporate structure 
Span of control  Scale (1-4) indicating the number of divisions reporting directly to corporate 
headquarters: 1 = 1 to 3; 2 = 4 to 10; 3 = 11 to 30; 4 = more than 30. 
Organizational layers  Scale (1-5): 1 = single business unit; 2 = dominant business unit; 3 = divisionalized, 
single BU divisions; 4 = divisionalized, multi-BU divisions; 5 = matrix of divisions. 
Corporate policies 
Financial control emphasis  Scale (1-3): 1 = flexible strategic control; 2 = tight strategic control; 3 = tight financial 
control. 
General planning influence  Score (0-9) based on strength of corporate influence in three areas: setting of 
budgets, major capital investments, and business strategy/ new business creation. 
Functional planning 
influence 
Score (0-15) based on strength of corporate influence in five functional areas: human 
resources, R&D, marketing, purchasing/ logistics, and information technology. 
Linkages between divisions  Score (0-9) reflecting extent of operational linkages between divisions in the provision 
of products/ services, development of technologies and dealings with customers. 
Shared services emphasis  Scale (1-3): 1 = less than 20% of HQ staff provide services to business divisions; 2= 
20 to 40%; 3 = more than 40%. 
Ownership and regulation   
Privately owned  0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Government owned  0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Regulated, public  Publicly owned, but subject to statutory regulation of competition/ prices: 0=no; 1=yes. 
Privatized  Previously owned by national or local government: 0=no; 1=yes 
Country  Categorical (FRA, GER, NL, UK, USA, JPN, CHL). 
Performance   
Overall effectiveness  Scale (1-3): 1 = needs improving in many areas; 2 = Needs improving in some areas; 
3 = good in most areas. 
Cost effectiveness  Scale (1-3) as above. 
Return on capital employed  Profit before interest and tax/ (Total assets – Current liabilities) 
averaged over previous five years. 
Shareholder return  (Increase in share price + Gross dividend)/ Initial share price 
averaged over previous five years. 
Growth in sales turnover  Percentage increase in sales turnover, average annual rate over previous five years. Analytic Paper 
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 Appendix 2.  Corporate portfoilios  
  FRA  GER  NL  UK  USA  JPN  CHL  All 
Number of companies  39  55  39  100  91  163  49  536 
Industry sector 
Mineral extraction and processing  5%  2%  3%  4%  7%  4%  10%  5% 
Building and construction  -  2%  10%  7%  1%  11%  2%  6% 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals  8%  7%  3%  6%  7%  13%  4%  8% 
Manufacturing  21%  13%  38%  21%  29%  37%  10%  27% 
Industrial services  8%  4%  23%  9%  11%  17%  6%  12% 
Retailing, transport & consumer services  18%  13%  8%  20%  31%  10%  10%  16% 
Telecommunications networks  5%  -  -  2%  2%  2%  4%  2% 
Electricity, gas and water utilities  3%  7%  3%  4%  1%  5%  12%  5% 
Commercial financial services  -  9%  3%  3%  3%  1%  8%  3% 
Retail financial services  18%  9%  5%  14%  4%  -  2%  6% 
Diversified/ conglomerate  10%  22%  3%  9%  1%  -  10%  6% 
Other  5%  13%  3%  1%  3%  -  20%  4% 
100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
                 
                 
                 
 
                 
                 
                 
Span of control  (scale value) 
1 - 3 divisions  (1)  18%  13%  10%  24%  30%  14%  33%  20% 
4 - 10  (2)  67%  53%  59%  65%  54%  49%  65%  57% 
11 - 30  (3)  10%  22%  31%  10%  12%  29%  2%  18% 
> 30  (4)  5%  13%  -  1%  3%  8%  -  5% 
100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Missing  -  -  -  1  1  20  -  22 
Divisional complexity  (scale value) 
Single business unit  (1)  3%  4%  -  3%  -  2%  6%  2% 
Dominant business unit  (2)  8%  9%  -  9%  15%  28%  31%  17% 
Single BU divisions  (3)  10%  11%  42%  38%  47%  28%  31%  31% 
Multi-BU divisions  (4)  56%  64%  55%  48%  30%  32%  33%  41% 
Matrix of divisions  (5)  23%  11%  3%  2%  8%  11%  -  8% 
100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Missing  -  2  1  -  -  7  -  10 
Geographical spread  (scale value) 
One country  (1)  15%  35%  13%  31%  36%  NA     51%  32% 
One continent  (2)  21%  22%  21%  8%  9%  NA     45%  18% 
Two continents  (3)  5%  9%  10%  19%  11%  NA     2%  11% 
Three or more continents  (4)  59%  35%  56%  42%  44%  NA     2%  39% 
100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  NA     100%  100% 
Missing  -  -  -  -  -  163  -  163 
 